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Abstract
How does corporate taxation affect the life cycle of firms? A change in profit-tax
rates affects the life cycle of firms through wages and through firm selection. We quan-
tify these effects by looking at the average size of young and mature US firms 30 years
after the Reagan Tax Cuts. We disentangle the wage and the selection effects using a
model of firm dynamics. We find that the wage effect of profit tax cuts is about six times
stronger than the selection effect. A change in population growth affects average firm
size by changing the composition of surviving firms. We find that the effect of declining
population growth on average firm size is three times stronger for mature firms than
for young firms.
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1 Introduction
The firm lifecycle has been proposed to be an important determinant of macroeconomic
outcomes (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014). Because it captures how quickly new businesses grow
as they age, the firm lifecycle is indicative of the quality of entering firms and the degree of
competition from incumbents. A policy instrument that directly affects the firm lifecycle is
corporate taxation. Changes to US corporate tax policy provide an interesting case study.
As noted by Auerbach and Slemrod (1997), US corporate taxes underwent a major tax
reform in the 1980s. Since then, the lifecycle of US firms has also changed: Table 1 shows
that US firms of all ages have been shrinking in size. Motivated by these observations,
this paper studies how corporate taxes affect the firm lifecycle. We quantify the effect of
corporate taxes by looking at post-1980 US data through the lens of a firm dynamics model.
Table 1: Average Firm Size
Young Mature
1980s 10.0 43.27
2010s 8.76 38.80
Percentage Change −12.3% −10.3%
Source. US Business Dynamics Statistics.
Notes. Young firms are ages 0 to 10, mature firms are ages above 10. The above-age-10 group is observed
starting in 1987. The 2010s includes years 2010 to 2016, the last year available in BDS data. Table 7 in
Appendix A shows that the pattern is robust to different date and age cutoffs.
A drop in corporate taxes affects the firm lifecycle along both intensive and extensive
margins. If the drop in taxes is passed onto workers in the form of higher wages, the cost
of hiring labor goes up and firms shrink along the intensive margin; see Suárez Serrato and
Zidar (2016) for evidence of tax passthrough in US states. The effect on the extensive margin
is due to taxes affecting firm selection via the firm entry-exit decision. Firm selection
determines the composition of surviving firms and therefore affects average size of all firm
ages. The effect of corporate taxes along the intensive and extensive margins interact with
each other: firm entry-exit decisions depend on profitability, which in turn depends on
wages. A general equilibrium model with firm entry and exit dynamics captures these
interactions. The workhorse model of firm dynamics, Hopenhayn (1992a), is one such
model. However, the contribution of profit taxes to the extensive margin in this model
is zero because the model features inelastic labor supply.1 In order to allow a nontrivial
1When the outside option of exiting firms is untaxed, wages in the canonical Hopenhayn (1992a) com-
pletely undo the effect of taxes, leaving firm profits and entry-exit decisions unchanged. Appendix B.2
provides a formal proof.
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role for the extensive margin, we introduce occupational choice between employment and
entrepreneurship as in Lucas (1978) to the workhorse Hopenhayn model. Our occupational
choice setting has the feature that it allows a drop in taxes to affect firm entry-exit decisions
in either direction, depending on parameter values. We can then let the data determine the
parameter values, and therefore the direction of the effect along the extensive margin.
As in Lucas, agents in our model choose whether to be employees or entrepreneurs.
As in Hopenhayn, the model features a stationary firm-size distribution, along with firm
growth and entry-exit dynamics. An agent who decides to be an entrepreneur pays an
entry cost that includes forgone wages, and draws the productivity of his firm from a
distribution that is iid across startups. After the productivity realization, the entrepreneur
decides whether to operate his firm or exit. If he operates the firm, he receives after-tax
firm profits and redraws his productivity next period. If he exits, he receives an exit payoff
and chooses his occupation again next period. The exit payoff also depends on wages and
captures the opportunity cost of operating a firm.
In this setting, a drop in profit taxes is passed onto workers in the form of higher wages.
The increase in the cost of hiring lowers average size for all age groups, which shows up
as a change along the intensive margin. Average size by age is also affected by the size
threshold at which firms exit, which shows up as a change along the extensive margin.
The effect of taxes on the exit threshold is determined by how taxes affect the exit payoff
relative to the entry cost. Because they depend on forgone wages, both the exit payoff and
the entry cost increase when profit taxes drop. Intuitively, the exit payoff relative to the
entry cost captures the effective benefit of shutting down an existing firm and replacing it
with a new firm. When the drop in taxes lowers the effective benefit, the exit threshold
declines reflecting the decreased benefit of replacing existing firms. If we interpret firms in
the model as capital, the effective benefit is similar to Tobin’s q. Under this interpretation,
the exit threshold captures the rate at which entrepreneurs invest in new firms. The rate of
investment declines when the drop in profit taxes lowers Tobin’s q.
For the quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model economy to match key features
of US firm entry-exit dynamics and the firm-size distribution in the 1980-89 period. The
profit-tax rate is set to 32 percent, the average of the effective corporate tax rate in the data
over the same time period. We then quantify the role of the intensive and extensive margins
using a counterfactual exercise in which we decrease profit taxes to 24 percent, the 2010-16
average corporate tax rate in the data. The intensive margin reduces average size for all age
groups by 12 percentage points. Because the intensive margin operates through an increase
in wages which affects all firms equally, its effect is identical in percentage terms for both
young and mature firms. The extensive margin, however, affects young and mature firms
differently. Firm selection along the extensive margin is stronger for young firms because
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these firms tend to be closer to the size threshold at which firms exit, reflecting the fact that
entrants start small and grow over time. Quantitatively, the effect of the extensive margin
is approximately one-sixth of the intensive margin: it reduces average size of young firms
by 2.2 pp and of mature firms by 1.9 pp.
Recent work by Hopenhayn, Neira and Singhania (2018) shows that changes in the rate
of population growth are of first-order importance in determining the evolution of the
firm-age distribution. These authors show that the effects of population growth operate
only through the extensive margin, not the intensive margin. The average size of young
and mature firms is an aggregate of average size by age for the underlying ages, weighted
by the firm-age distribution. Therefore a change in the rate of population growth affects
average size of the young and mature groups through the age distribution.
We introduce population growth into the calibrated model and compare its effects to
that of changes in firm selection due to profit taxes. We find that population growth and
firm selection work in opposite directions. A decline in population growth affects young
and mature firms differently. It increases average size of young firms by 1.2pp and that
of mature firms by 3.4pp. The increase occurs because population growth shifts the age
distribution towards older firms, which are larger. The aging effect is stronger for mature
firms because that group includes all firms with age above 10, and therefore does not have
an upper bound on age. The main takeaway from these counterfactual exercises is that
the wage effect of profit tax cuts is six times larger than the selection effect. The effect of
population growth is about three times stronger for mature firms than it is for young firms.
We extend the analysis to consider the case of profit tax cuts that disproportionately
benefit large firms, and the case of labor tax cuts. Both these extensions reinforce the
takeaway from the benchmark counterfactual. The wage effect is much stronger than the
selection effect. The effects of population growth are stronger for mature firms than for
young firms.
Related Literature. Our paper is related to the literature on the incidence of corporate
taxation. Since at least Harberger (1962) the literature has identified that a decline in corpo-
rate tax rates leads to an increase in wages in closed economies. The traditional mechanism
is that, because firms are capital, a decline in corporate taxes is equivalent to a decline in
capital taxes. As capital taxes decline, investment increases, raising the stock of capital
and the marginal product of labor, which in turn increases wages. Similarly, in our paper,
a decline in corporate tax rates increases the number of firms, which raises the marginal
product of labor and therefore wages. Recent empirical work finds evidence for this ef-
fect. Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) use data on US states and find that a 1 percent cut
in business taxes increases real wages anywhere from 0.58 percent to 1.1 percent over a
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ten-year period. Using German data, Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2018) find that a tax cut
of 1 percent increases real wages by 0.39 percent.
Our paper is related to Sedlác˘ek and Sterk (2019) who analyze the effect of the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act on US business dynamism through the lens of the workhorse Hopenhayn
model. In their paper, endogenous exit is generated via a fixed operating cost which is
tax deductible. The feature of that setup is that corporate taxes affect firm selection in
the same direction, regardless of parameter values. We generate endogenous exit through
occupational choice, which has the feature that the direction of the effect is not built into
the model.
The decline in the average firm size conditional on firm age has been documented
earlier. Hopenhayn, Neira and Singhania (2018) document this decline and show that
declining population growth increases average firm size in the aggregate by shifting the
firm-age distribution towards older firms, which tend to be larger. Pugsley, Sedlácˇek and
Sterk (2019) document a decline in the proportion of high-growth entrants in the US, which
also shows up as a change in the lifecycle of US firms. Ignaszak (2019) explores the role
of the supply of college-educated workers for a similar change in the lifecycle of firms in
Germany.
The setup of our model is closely related to Hopenhayn (2016). That paper combines
occupational choice with firm entry-exit in a static setting to study firm size and its impli-
cations for cross-country TFP differences. Neira and Singhania (2018) use a similar model
with permanent shocks to study how corporate taxes affect firm entry rates. The setup we
use in this paper is more general in that it features occupational choice and firm dynamics
with iid shocks. More broadly, our paper is related to studies that investigate the interaction
between occupational choice and firm dynamics; see, for example, Buera and Shin (2013),
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and Yurdagul (2017).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 presents the calibration and the main counterfactual experiment. Section 4 extends the
analysis to heterogeneous profit tax cuts and labor tax cuts. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Firms in the model economy produce a single good, which we denote as the numeraire.
Firm output is produced using labor. The production function of a firm is
f (z, n) = znα, (1)
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where z represents firm productivity and n is the number of employees. The production
function exhibits decreasing returns to scale, α < 1. Each firm is run by one entrepreneur.
Given productivity z and the wage rate w, the entrepreneur chooses the number of em-
ployees n so as to maximize firm profits. Let n(z,w) and π(z,w) denote the corresponding
employment and profit functions, respectively. Both functions are increasing in z and de-
creasing in w.
The economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely-lived agents with discount factor
β. Agents are ex-ante identical, risk neutral, and maximize the present value of lifetime
payoffs. At the beginning of a period, agents choose between working for a wage or starting
their own firm. Agents who decide to start their own firm pay a fixed entry cost of ce units
of output and forgo the opportunity to work until the firm exits. Therefore, the cost of
entry includes a fixed component ce and a variable component that depends on wages.
After agents pay the entry cost, firm productivity z is drawn from a distribution with
support Z and CDF G. The productivity draw is iid across startups. Once drawn, the
productivity of a firm evolves according to a persistent Markov process with conditional
distribution F(zt+1|zt). The conditional distribution is continuous and nondecreasing.
After the productivity realization, agents in their role as entrepreneurs choose whether
to operate their firm or to exit. Entrepreneurs operating the firm receive after-tax firm prof-
its. Entrepreneurs who exit recover b units of output. The positive exit payoff—equal to b
plus discounted future payoffs—generates endogenous exit in the model. One interpreta-
tion of b is that of a salvage value of a firm upon exit.2 In the next period, surviving firms
redraw their productivity and again decide whether to exit or to continue. Entrepreneurs
of firms that exit cannot work in the current period. These agents face the occupational
choice decision at the beginning of the next period.
A government authority taxes firm profits at the rate τ. Tax revenues are returned as
lump-sum transfers to all agents such that the government balances its budget every period.
Let V(z,wt) denote the value of a firm with productivity z that faces a deterministic
path of the wage rate wt = {wτ}τ≥t. Let W(wt) denote the value function of an agent
before he chooses his occupation. We have
W(wt) = max
{
wt + βW(wt+1),
∫
V(z,wt)G(dz)− ce
}
. (2)
The agent compares his payoff from working for the wage wt today and choosing his
occupation again next period, to the expected payoff from starting a firm net of the fixed
2Another interpretation is that b determines the operating cost of keeping the firm alive for another period.
More precisely, the value function can be written such that (1− β)b+ βw is the operating cost each period;
see Appendix B. This operating cost can be thought of as the opportunity cost of not being an employee next
period βw and current entrepreneurial effort (1− β)b.
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cost of entry.
The value of a firm is
V(z,wt) = max
{
b+ βW(wt+1), (1− τ)π(z,wt) + β
∫
V(z′,wt+1)F(dz′|z)
}
. (3)
The value function V(z,wt) indicates that the entrepreneur running the firm with produc-
tivity z chooses between operating and exiting. If he exits, the entrepreneur receives the
payoff b plus the present value of choosing his occupation next period βW ′(wt+1). If the
entrepreneur chooses to operate, he receives a period payoff equal to after-tax firm profits,
(1− τ)π(z,wt) and the expected discounted future value of the firm.
Firm profits, and therefore firm values, are increasing in productivity z. There exists a
productivity threshold z∗t such that firms with z ≤ z
∗
t exit. Let x(z,wt) denote the policy
function associated with V(z,wt). Define x(z,wt) to equal 1 if a firm has productivity
z ≤ z∗t and chooses to exit. The policy function equals 0 for firms that do not exit, those
with z ≥ z∗t .
Let µt denote the measure of firms operating in period t. The measure gives us the mass
of firms with productivity below z, µt(z) =
∫
z≤z∗t
dµt(z). The total mass of operating firms
at time t is Mt =
∫
dµt(z). Let st denote the measure of operating startups in period t. We
have st(z) =
∫
z≤z∗t
dG(z). The total mass of operating startups in period t is St =
∫
dst(z).
Because the fraction G(z∗t ) of startups exit without operating, the total mass of entering star-
tups is St/(1−G(z∗t )). Let xt measure incumbent firms that exit at the beginning of period
t. Given the policy function for exit, we have xt(z) =
∫ ∫
z≤z∗ x(z,wt)dF(z
′|z)dµt−1(z). The
total mass of exiting firms is denoted Xt. Note that we only count firms that have operated
for at least one period amongst exiting firms. The mass of startups that exit immediately,
StG(z∗t )/(1− G(z
∗
t )), is not included in Xt.
The mass of operating firms in period t + 1 equals the mass of surviving incumbents
µt(z)− xt+1(z) plus the mass of operating startups st+1(z). We have
µt+1(z) = µt(z)− xt+1(z) + st+1(z). (4)
Let Nt denote the mass of employees in period t. Because the total number of agents is
normalized to 1, we have the following resource constraint,
Nt = 1−Mt − Xt −
St
1− G(z∗t )
G(z∗t ).
At the end of the current period, the entrepreneurs of non-operating firms join the
agents who were employees in the current period. Therefore, at the beginning of the
next period, the mass of agents facing the occupational choice decision equals Nt + Xt +
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StG(z∗t )/[1− G(z
∗
t )], or equivalently 1−Mt.
The model economy exhibits a stationary firm-productivity distribution when the measure
µ is invariant across periods, µt+1(z) = µt(z) for all z. Equivalently, from (4), we have
st+1(z) = xt+1(z) for a stationary distribution. For each z, the mass of operating startups
st+1(z) must replace the mass of exiting firms xt+1(z). Because startups replace existing
firms that exit, a stationary distribution of firm productivity allows for entry-exit dynamics
at the individual firm level.
A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of a constant sequence of wages wt = w∗,
exit threshold z∗, value functions V(z,w∗), and W(w∗), labor demand function n(z,w∗),
exit-policy function x(z,w∗), aggregate measure µ∗, mass of startups S, mass of firms M,
mass of employees N, mass of exiting firms X, and lump-sum transfers T such that
1. Exit: (1− τ)π(z∗,w∗) + β
∫
V(z′,w∗)F(dz′|z∗) = b+ βW(w∗),
2. Entry:
∫
V(z,w∗)G(dz)− ce = w∗ + βW(w∗),
3. Labor-market clearing:
∫ ∞
z∗ n(z,w
∗)µ∗(dz) = N,
4. Resource constraint: N + M+ X+ S1−G(z∗)G(z
∗) = 1,
5. Government budget balance: T + τ
∫ ∞
z∗ π(z,w
∗)µ∗(dz) = 0,
6. Stationary distribution: µ′ = µ = µ∗ solves (4).
The exit condition indicates an agent operating a firm with productivity z∗ is indifferent be-
tween operating and exiting. Because firm value is increasing in productivity z, it is optimal
for firms with z ≤ z∗ to exit and for firms with z ≥ z∗ to operate. The entry condition states
that an individual agent is indifferent between starting a firm, payoff
∫
V(z)G(dz)− ce, or
working for a wage this period and choosing his occupation again next period, for the
payoff w∗ + βW(w∗). The value of being an agent who is yet to choose an occupation is
found by applying the indifference condition to (2). We obtain W(wt) = wt + βW(wt+1).
In a stationary equilibrium, the wage rate is invariant over time, so we have
W(w∗) =
w∗
1− β
. (5)
The labor-market-clearing condition states that aggregate labor demand by operating
firms,
∫ ∞
z∗ n(z,w
∗)µ(dz), equals aggregate labor supply, N. The resource constraint states
that the total number of employees and entrepreneurs in the economy equals the size of
the population. The government-budget-balance condition states that lump-sum transfers
equal total tax revenues. Because lump-sum transfers are paid to agents regardless of
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whether they work or start a firm, and regardless of what the firm does subsequently, these
transfers do not affect any other equilibrium variables.
Proposition 1. In a stationary equilibrium, a decrease in the profit-tax rate τ increases the wage
rate w∗.
Proof. Suppose the wage rate does not change with τ. Then the decrease in τ increases after-tax
profits and therefore firm value. Because the outside option does not change, the exit condition
implies that z∗ must decrease. However, the entry condition cannot hold at the lower value of z∗.
This is because the expected value of the startup increases, but the cost of entry is unchanged. It
follows that the wage rate must change with τ. A decrease in the wage rate cannot be consistent
with equilibrium because it raises firm values, exacerbating the effect of the initial decrease in τ.
Therefore, w∗ must increase. Intuitively, a decrease in the profit tax rate raises firm values, which
spurs entry. The corresponding increase in labor demand raises wages.
To determine how profit taxes affect the exit threshold, we look at the effect of profit
taxes on the costs and benefits of exiting. In equilibrium, the entry and exit conditions hold
with equality. This implies that
V(z∗,w∗)
E[V(z,w∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective cost of exit
=
b+ βw
∗
1−β
ce + w∗ +
βw∗
1−β︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective benefit of exit
, (6)
where we use equation (5) to substitute for W(w∗). The mathematical expectation on the
left-hand side is taken over the startup distribution G. This formulation captures the fact
that the relevant costs and benefits of exit are defined relative to the value of the outside
option. The effective cost of exit is the value of the marginal firm normalized by the value
of the average firm. Similarly, the effective benefit of exit is the exit payoff normalized by the
entry cost. Notice we can manipulate equation (6) to write
V(z∗,w∗)
b+ βw
∗
1−β
=
βE[V(z,w∗)]
β
(
ce + w∗ +
βw∗
1−β
) , (7)
which has a neat economic interpretation. The left-hand-side is the rate of return from op-
erating the marginal firm today and the right-hand-side is the rate of return from shutting
down the marginal firm and creating a startup tomorrow. Therefore, equation (6) implies
that the exit threshold z∗ is such that the marginal entrepreneur is indifferent between
operating his firm today, and shutting down and creating a startup tomorrow.
The expected value of an entrant, E[V(z,w∗)], is a weighted average of the value of
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startups that do not operate, those with z ≤ z∗, and the average value of operating startups,
those with z ≥ z∗. It follows that the inverse of the effective cost of exit can be written as
E[V(z,w∗)]
V(z∗,w∗)
= G(z∗) + [1− G(z∗)]
E[V(z,w∗)|z ≥ z∗]
V(z∗,w∗)
(8)
where we have used the fact that the value of a non-operating startup is V(z∗,w∗). Notice
that E[V(z,w∗)|z ≥ z∗]/V(z∗,w∗) > 1, corresponding to the fact that the value of operating
startup exceeds the value of the marginal startup. Therefore, the inverse of the effective cost
of exit in (6) is a weighted average, with the weight G(z∗) on unity and the weight 1−G(z∗)
on a number greater than unity.
A change in the profit tax rate affects the exit threshold z∗ if it alters either the effective
cost or the effective benefit of exit. In what follows, we provide conditions under which a
change in taxes affects the effective benefit of exit. We then show that the exit threshold z∗
must change for the effective benefit to equal the effective cost. We then discuss the role of
occupational choice in obtaining these results. Finally, we discuss the decomposition that
allows us to quantify the role of the intensive and extensive margins of corporate taxes on
the firm lifecycle.
Corollary 1. Consider a drop in profit taxes. The effective benefit of exit (i) remains unchanged if
b = βce, (ii) decreases if b > βce, and (iii) increases if b < βce.
Proof. Differentiate the effective benefit of entry with respect to τ and use Proposition 1.
The results in Corollary 1 can be understood by writing the effective benefit as follows,
Effective benefit of exit = β×
 b+ βw1−β
βce +
βw
1−β
 (9)
This formulation highlights that, when b = βce, the relative benefit of the marginal firm
exiting and an re-entering next period simply equals the time discount factor β. This is
because the present value of the entry cost paid next period, βce + wβ/(1 − β), exactly
equals the cost of exit b+ wβ/(1− β) this period. In that case, the effective benefit of exit
is independent of wages and therefore unaffected by changes in the profit tax.
If b 6= βce, a drop in the profit-tax rate changes the effective benefit of exit through
wages. The direction of the change depends on how sensitive the entry cost and the exit
payoff are to the increase in wages. If b < βce, the exit payoff is more sensitive to the
increase in wages. As a result, the numerator in (9) increases by more than the denominator
and the effective benefit of exit increases. The opposite is true if b > βce: when wages
increase the denominator increases by more than the numerator leading to a decrease in
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the effective benefit of exit. The parameters b and βce determine what proportion of the
entry cost and the exit payoff consist of wages, and therefore control the sensitivity of these
variables to the increase in wages.
Consider a drop in profit taxes. Suppose b > βce and the corresponding increase in
wages reduces the effective benefit of exit. To restore equilibrium, the effective cost of exit
must decrease to equal the lower effective benefit. From (8), the effective cost can decrease
either because the relative value of operating startups increases, or because z∗ drops raising
the weighted average. The following corollary shows that, keeping z∗ fixed, the change in
the relative value of operating startups is not enough to restore equilibrium. Therefore, z∗
must decrease when taxes lower the effective benefit of exit.
Corollary 2. Consider a drop in the profit tax rate τ. For a fixed z∗, we have
d
dτ
(
E[V(z,w∗)]
V(z∗,w∗)
) ∣∣∣∣∣
z∗
≥
d
dτ
(
E[V(z,w∗)|z ≥ z∗]
V(z∗,w∗)
) ∣∣∣∣∣
z∗
.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Corollary 2 shows that the change in the inverse of the effective cost of exit is greater
than the change in the relative value of operating startups. This result implies that the exit
threshold z∗ must change when a drop in taxes lowers the effective cost of exit. Because
E[V(z,w∗)|z ≥ z∗]/V(z∗,w∗) > 1, the threshold z∗ must decrease so as to increase the
weight 1− G(z∗) until the effective cost equals the lower effective benefit. This result is
easy to see in a permanent shock economy in which startups draw their productivity from
a Pareto distribution; see Neira and Singhania (2018). In this economy, the relative value
of operating startups is independent of taxes, and so unaffected by the drop in τ. The
decrease in the effective benefit must therefore be accommodated entirely by a decrease in
z∗, which leads to an increase in the weight 1− G(z∗).
The following proposition summarizes how a change in profit taxes affects the exit
threshold.
Proposition 2. Consider a drop in profit taxes. The exit threshold z∗ (i) remains unchanged if
b = βce, (ii) decreases if b > βce, and (iii) increases if b < βce.
Proof. Follows from Corollaries 1, 2 and Proposition 1.
Firms in the model are similar to capital. The effective benefit of exiting is the market
value of the firm divided by the cost of replacing the firm next period. This ratio is similar
to Tobin’s q. When b = βce, taxes do not affect the q-ratio so firm entry-exit are unaffected.
When b > βce, a drop in profit taxes lowers Tobin’s q making it less attractive to shut down
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an existing firm and create a new firm next period. This implies that the exit threshold
declines. With b > βce, the effect of lower taxes on the exit threshold is the same as that of
a higher fixed cost of entry, ce. Both these changes lower the effective benefit of exit leading
to a decrease in the exit threshold. There is, however, a crucial difference: lowering taxes
raises wages, whereas increasing ce leads to a drop in wages. This difference leads to the
two experiments having opposite implications for firm size.
The Role of Occupational Choice. The exit threshold is neutral to changes in profit taxes
in a standard firm-dynamics model that does not feature occupational choice; see Appendix
B.2 for details. This model corresponds to a version of Hopenhayn (1992a). It features
inelastic labor supply and a pool of potential startups, instead of a mass of people who
face an employment-entrepreneurship tradeoff. The rest of the setup is identical to the
model presented in this paper. Without occupational choice, a drop in profit taxes raises
the wage rate as in Proposition 1. However, the increase in wages does not change the
effective benefit of exiting, which in this case is equal to ce/b. Because labor supply is
perfectly inelastic, the increase in wages exactly offsets the initial drop in taxes, leaving
firm profits and therefore the effective benefit of exiting unchanged. Taxes do not change
the effective cost or benefit of exit, so the exit threshold is unaffected. In the presence
of the occupational choice, however, labor supply is not perfectly inelastic. Therefore the
passthrough of the drop in profit taxes to wages is incomplete, and the exit threshold is
affected as discussed above.
We generated firm exit by providing entrepreneurs with the outside option of working.
A commonly employed version of the Hopenhayn model generates firm exit by assuming
that firms face a fixed cost of operation, which they can avoid by exiting. If firms pay
taxes on profits net of operating costs, a decrease in the profit-tax rate increases the exit
threshold. The intuition is simple: a drop in profit taxes increases wages, without increasing
operating costs, and therefore the productivity threshold at which firms break even goes
up; see Sedlác˘ek and Sterk (2019). Instead, if firms pay taxes on gross profits, which include
operating costs, then we recover the result that the exit threshold is neutral to changes in
taxes. As Proposition 2 shows, introducing occupational choice allows a drop in taxes to
affect the exit threshold in both directions, depending on parameter values.
Intensive vs Extensive Margins. To measure the effect of corporate taxes on the firm
lifecycle, we look at how average size by firm age changes across steady states pre- and
post-reform. Let AFS denote average size of firms for a generic age group. We have
AFS =
∫
n(z,w∗)µ(dz) (10)
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where µ denotes the productivity distribution of firms in that group. The percentage
change in average size by age in pre- and post-reform steady states can be decomposed
as follows
%∆AFS =
1
AFSpre
∫
[n(z,w∗post)− n(z,w
∗
pre)]µpre(dz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive margin
+
1
AFSpre
∫
n(z,w∗post)[µpost − µpre](dz).︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive margin
(11)
The decomposition follows by adding and subtracting 1AFSpre
∫
n(z,w∗post)µpre(dz) on the
right hand side of the definition of the percentage change in average firm size.
The intensive margin isolates the contribution of the change in the number of employees
within firms in response to the change in wages, by keeping the weights of the productivity
distribution at their pre-reform values. The employment function is given by
n(z,w) =
(zα
w
)1/(1−α)
.
Because the employment function is log-linear, the percentage decrease in employment
following an increase in wages is identical for all productivities z. We refer to this as the
wage effect. By itself the wage effect leads to identical percentage declines in average size by
age for all firm ages.
The extensive margin isolates the contribution of the weights of the productivity dis-
tribution to the change in average size of the group, by keeping firm employment at its
post-reform values. The weights change because taxes affect the exit threshold and there-
fore the degree of firm selection. We refer to this as the selection effect. The impact of the
selection effect on average size is easiest to see for entrants. The average size of entrants is∫ ∞
z∗ n(z,w)dG(z). A higher value of the exit threshold z
∗, increases the size of the smallest
operating startup without affecting the distribution G. Because firm selection determines
the composition of surviving firms, the average size of older ages is also affected.
3 Quantitative Analysis
We next evaluate the quantitative importance of the intensive and extensive margins of cor-
porate tax changes. The quantitative exercise consists of calibrating the model to a balanced
growth path corresponding to the US economy in the 1980-89 period. Hopenhayn, Neira
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and Singhania (2018) show that population growth dynamics are of first-order importance
for firm dynamics. We introduce population growth in our baseline calibration to study
how the effects of corporate taxes on the firm lifecycle interact with population growth. We
run a counterfactual in which we compute a balanced growth path with lower profit tax
rates and lower population growth, corresponding to their 2010-16 averages, while keep-
ing all other parameters unchanged. We then quantify the effects along the extensive and
intensive margins and further decompose our results into the wage and selection effect of
taxes and the effects of population growth.
Table 2
Assigned
Value Definition Basis
β 0.96 Discount factor Annual interest rate of 4 percent
α 0.64 Curvature Standard
δ 1.65% Exogenous exit rate Exit rate of firms size 20+, 1980-89
g 1.64% Population growth Labor force growth 1980-89
τπ 32% Profit tax rate Effective corporate tax rate 1980-89
τℓ 20% Labor income tax rate McDaniel (2007)
Jointly Calibrated
Parameters Moments
Value Definition Data Model
ce 66.57 Fixed cost of entry Entry rate 1980-89 12.41% 12.54%
b 66.43 Exit payoff Response of wages to corporate tax cuts 60% 60%
µG −1.18 Mean of startup dist. Average startup size 1980-89 6.11 6.11
µz −0.004 Drift in AR(1) Average firm size 1980-89 20.55 20.56
ρ 0.971 Persistence of AR(1) w∗ = 1 — —
σε 0.229 St. dev. of AR(1) shocks 5-year exit rate 1980-89 54.65 % 53.63%
Calibration. A model period is set to one year. The discount factor β is set to its standard
value of 0.96, which corresponds to an annual interest rate of 4 percent. The curvature
parameter of the production function α is set to its standard value of 0.64. This value of α
implies an aggregate labor share of 0.64, which is broadly consistent with labor’s share of
national income. We set the growth rate of population to 1.64 percent, equal to the average
rate of labor force growth for the 1980-89 period. In the model, firms larger than a certain
size are unlikely to exit endogenously because they are too far from the exit threshold. In
the data, however, large firms have positive exit rates. In order to be consistent with this
fact, we introduce an exogenous exit rate into the model. It is set to 1.65 percent to match
the exit rate of larger firms (20 employees or more) for the 1980-89 period. The profit tax
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rate is set to the average effective corporate tax rate calculated in Zucman (2014) for the
1980-89 period. Because labor income is taxed in the data and taxes on labor income matter
for the employment-entrepreneurship margin, we introduce a flat-tax on labor income and
map it to the aggregate labor income tax rate in McDaniel (2007).
Log-productivity follows an AR(1) process,
log(zt+1) = µz + ρ log(zt) + εt+1; εt+1 ∼ N (0, σ2ε )
with ρ as the persistence parameter, µz as the drift parameter and σ2ε as the variance of
shocks. The distribution of startup productivities G is lognormal with mean µG and vari-
ance σ2G. We reduce the number of parameters by tying the variance of startup productivity
to the variance of the AR(1) process, σ2G = σ
2
ǫ/(1− ρ
2), as in Hopenhayn (1992b).
We calibrate the remaining parameters {ce, b, µG, µs, ρ, σε} to jointly match 1980-89 aver-
ages of the startup rate, average startup size, average firm size, and 5-year exit rates. We
normalize wages to unity in the benchmark calibration, as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993). Doing so addresses the identification issue that arises because prices and produc-
tivity enter multiplicatively in first order conditions, implying that changes in prices and
productivity cannot be disentangled. In order to discipline the response of of wages to cor-
porate tax cuts, we target the lower bound of the wage-response estimate in Suárez Serrato
and Zidar (2016, Table 5).
All calibrated parameters jointly influence all the targets. We highlight certain param-
eters that play a more important role in matching certain targets. The fixed entry cost ce
primarily determines the entry rate. The parameter µG controls the mean of the startup
distribution, and therefore plays an important role in the average size of startups. The drift
of the AR(1) process, µz, primarily determines average productivity and therefore average
firm size. The variance of shocks to the AR(1) process determine the size of the exit region,
so this parameter gets at the 5-year exit rate.
Table 2 summarizes the calibrated parameters along with the targets and the corre-
sponding match. We saw in Proposition 2 that the effect of tax cuts on the exit threshold,
and therefore on the direction of the selection effect, depends on the relationship between
b and βce. We do not impose any restrictions on the parameter space and let the data de-
termine the relationship between these parameters. The calibrated value of b implies that
the salvage value of a firm is slightly lower than the fixed entry cost ce. Because b is greater
than βce in the calibration, a drop in profit taxes by itself will lower the exit threshold in
the calibrated model.
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3.1 Findings
Table 3: Average Firm Size
Young Mature
Model Data Model Data
1980s 11.95 10.00 39.07 43.27
2010s 10.39 8.76 34.92 38.80
Percentage Change −13.1% −12.3% −10.6% −10.3%
Notes. Firms aged 0 to 10 are classified as young, whereas firms aged above 10 are classified as mature. The
model values for the 1980s are nontargeted moments in the benchmark calibration, with a profit tax rate of
32 percent and a population growth rate of 1.64 percent. The model values for the 2010s are generated by
running a counterfactual with a profit tax rate of 24 percent and a population growth rate of 0.59 percent. All
other parameters are kept at their 1980s levels.
Average Firm Size by Age. Given that we are quantifying the effect of corporate tax
changes on the lifecycle of US firms, it is important that the we start off with a reasonable
match to the US firm life cycle. The first row of Table 3 compares average size of young
and mature firms in the 1980s benchmark calibration to US data over the same time period.
The model does a decent job of capturing the average size of both young and mature firms,
even though these were not directly targeted moments.
The second row of Table 3 reports the benchmark counterfactual exercise, which we
label the 2010s economy. In this counterfactual all parameters are the same as in the 1980s
economy except for two changes. First, the profit-tax rate drops from 32 percent in the 1980s
to 24 percent in the 2010s. The 8pp drop in the profit-tax rate corresponds to the observed
drop in the data for corporate taxes paid on the domestic income of C-corporations from
the 1980s to the 2010s (Zucman, 2014).3 Second, the population growth rate drops from
1.64 percent in the 1980s to 0.59 percent in the 2010s, the average US labor force growth
rate from 2010 to 2016. The third row reports the percentage change in the average size of
each age group between the 1980s and the 2010s.
We compare the decline in average size in the counterfactual economy to the decline in
the data. The purpose of this comparison is not to claim that profit tax cuts were responsible
3Zucman (2014) reports values up until the year 2013. We extend the calculations of Zucman (2014) to
the year 2016 and consider the difference between the 1980-89 average to the 2010-16 average. Our extension
of Zucman’s calculations is available on our websites. There are several measures of effective corporate
tax rates. We consider the most conservative measure of the tax change, Effective Corporate Tax Rates on
Domestic Income Excluding S-Corps, which results in an 8 percentage point drop. The drop in taxes increases
to 11pp if we include S-Corps. The inclusion of taxes paid on foreign corporate income increases the tax drop
by a further 1pp.
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for the decline in average size observed in US data. Rather, the comparison serves as a check
that the decline in average size generated by the model is plausible, in that it is within the
ballpark of the change in the data. Young firms in the model shrink by 1.56 employees
versus 1.24 in the data, and mature firms in the model shrink by 4.15 employees versus 4.47
in the data. In percentage terms, young firms in the model shrink by 13.1 percent versus
12.3 percent in the data, and mature firms in the model shrink by 10.6 percent versus 10.3
percent in the data.
Table 4: Profit Tax Counterfactual
Young Mature |∆|
INTENSIVE MARGIN
Wage Effect −12.04 −12.04 0
EXTENSIVE MARGIN
Selection Effect −2.17 −1.94 0.23
Population Growth 1.16 3.39 2.23
Interaction −0.03 −0.04 0.01
Total Change −13.08 −10.63 2.45
Notes. The values indicate percentage changes in average firm size.
What is behind the drop in average size for each age group? Table 4 decomposes the
change in average size in the counterfactual for each age group into intensive and extensive
margins, as in (11). The wage effect of profit taxes acts along the intensive margin and
generates a 12 percent drop in average size for both young and mature firms. The effects
along the extensive margin combine two separate effects. First, because b is greater than
βce in the calibrated model, the selection effect of profit taxes lowers the exit threshold
which lowers average size for both age groups. The decline in average size is greater for
the young group, 2.5 percent vs 2.2 percent, reflecting the fact that young firms tend to
be closer to the exit threshold. The second effect along the extensive margin is the change
in composition arising from a decline in population growth. As shown in Hopenhayn,
Neira and Singhania (2018), a decline in population growth shifts the firm age distribution
towards older firms, which are larger on average. The effect of population growth works
in the opposite direction: it increases the average size of young and mature firms by 1.3 and
3.9 percent, respectively.
Decomposing the change in average size in the counterfactual exercise conveys two
messages. First, the wage effects of profit tax cuts generate most of the decline in average
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firm size by age in the counterfactual economy. In terms of magnitudes, the wage effect is
roughly four to six times as large as the selection or population growth effect, depending on
the age group. The second message is that the differential decline in average size of young
and mature firms that we observe in the counterfactual is generated mostly by changes
in population growth. While both the selection and population growth effects generate a
differential decline in average size, the two effects operate in different ways. The selection
effect works by reducing the average size of the young age group, whereas the population
growth effect works by increasing the average size of the mature group.
4 Extensions
Table 5: Heterogeneous Tax Cuts Counterfactual
Young Mature |∆|
INTENSIVE MARGIN
Wage Effect −10.71 −10.71 0
EXTENSIVE MARGIN
Selection Effect 0 0 0
Population Growth 1.18 3.44 2.26
Interaction 0 0 0
Total Change −9.53 −7.27 2.26
Notes. The values indicate percentage changes in average firm size.
Heterogeneous Tax Cuts. In the benchmark counterfactual, taxes were reduced by 8 per-
centage points uniformly for all firms. How do the effects along the extensive and intensive
margins change when profit-tax cuts disproportionately benefit larger firms? We explore
this scenario by considering a tax reform in which the aggregate decline in the profit tax
rate is the same, 8 percentage points, but the magnitude of the decline increases linearly
with firm size. The linear tax function is such that the smallest firms do not benefit from
tax cuts and pay a 32 percent tax on profits, whereas the largest firms benefit maximally
from the tax cut and pay no taxes on their profits.4
4In particular, we consider the tax function τπ(z) = max{0, 0.32−m · n(z)}, where m = 1.65× 10−4. This
function implies that the tax rate for the smallest firms is 32 percent. Firms with more than 1960 employees
pay zero profit taxes.
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As in the benchmark counterfactual, we reduce both profit taxes and population growth
in the heterogenous tax cut counterfactual. Table 5 decomposes the resulting decline in
average size along the intensive and extensive margins. The table reiterates the messages
from the benchmark counterfactual with uniform reduction in profit taxes. The wage effects
along the intensive margin mostly generate the magnitude of the decline in average firm
size for both the age groups, and the effects due to population growth mostly generate the
difference between young and mature firms. The primary difference from the case with
uniform tax cuts is that the role of selection is muted. This reflects the fact that the exit
threshold is determined by the the change in value of the smallest firms. The heterogenous
tax cuts benefit the smallest firms only in expectation, which is why the exit threshold
moves little.
Table 6: Profit Tax vs. Labor Tax Counterfactuals
Panel A:
Profit Tax Cuts
Panel B:
Labor Tax Cuts
Panel C:
Combined
Young Mature |∆| Young Mature |∆| Young Mature |∆|
INTENSIVE MARGIN
Wage Effect −12.04 −12.04 0 −14.92 −14.92 0 −25.13 −25.13 0
Labor Tax Effect 0 0 0 24.49 24.49 0 24.49 24.49 0
Interaction 0 0 0 −3.66 −3.66 0 −6.15 −6.15 0
EXTENSIVE MARGIN
Selection Effect −2.17 −1.94 0.23 −2.62 −2.34 0.28 −4.54 −4.06 0.48
Population Growth 1.16 3.39 2.23 1.40 4.08 2.68 1.23 3.59 2.36
Interaction −0.03 −0.04 0.01 −0.03 −0.04 0.01 −0.06 −0.09 0.03
Total Change −13.08 −10.63 2.45 4.66 7.61 2.95 −10.16 −7.35 2.81
Notes. The values indicate percentage changes in average firm size.
Profit Tax Cuts vs. Labor Tax Cuts. The benchmark specification abstracted from changes
in labor income taxes. Agents in our model choose between entrepreneurship and employ-
ment so, in addition to profit taxes, any changes in taxes on labor income will also affect
the firm lifecycle. In this section we extend our decomposition exercise to the case of labor
tax cuts. Our goal is to compare the effects of labor tax cuts to those of profit tax cuts, and
study their interactions.
Unlike profit taxes, labor taxes show up directly in first-order condition of firms. There-
fore, a decline in labor taxes affects the intensive margin via the direct effect and via its
effect on wages. Some of the decline in labor taxes passes through to firms, so firm se-
lection is also affected. To compare the effect of labor-tax cuts to profit-tax cuts, we run a
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counterfactual in which we reduce labor taxes in the benchmark economy by 9.3pp.5 As
with the other counterfactuals, we simultaneously change the rate of population growth
to 0.59 percent, the average value of labor force growth in the 2010s. Table 6 presents the
comparison. Panel A of that table reproduces the results for the benchmark counterfactual,
while Panel B shows the results for the labor-tax counterfactual. The drop in labor taxes,
combined with the drop in population growth, increases average size for young and ma-
ture firms by 4.66 percent and 7.71 percent, respectively. The direct effect of the decline in
labor taxes is to reduce wages and increase average size for both age groups. This effect
dominates the other effects, resulting in an increase in average size for both age groups.
Both the magnitude and the direction of the wage, selection and population growth effects
are similar to the benchmark counterfactual.
Table 6 Panel C shows the results for the case in which we combine profit-tax and
labor-tax cuts. In this counterfactual, we start with the benchmark and uniformly reduce
both profit taxes and labor taxes, by 8pp and 9.3pp respectively, along with population
growth. We find that average size for young and mature firms drops by 10.16 and 7.35
percentage points, respectively. The drop in average size for both age groups is less than
the profit-tax case in Panel A because the direct effect of labor taxes increases average
size, counteracting the wage effect. The simultaneous reduction in both profit and labor
taxes generates an interaction effect along the intensive margin, which was not present in
the earlier counterfactual exercises. This interaction effect is about one-fourth of the wage
effect. Labor tax cuts reinforce the selection effect of profit tax cuts, doubling the overall
contribution of this effect. The effects of declining population growth on average size do
not change much with the introduction of labor tax cuts.
There are two takeaway messages from this section. First, the introduction of labor tax
cuts dampens the overall effect of profit tax cuts along the intensive margin, but enhances
the selection effect along the extensive margin. The second takeaway is that the exercise
in this section reinforces the message from the earlier counterfactual exercises. When both
profit taxes and labor taxes are reduced simultaneously, it is the intensive margin that
generates the bulk of the decline in average size by age. The differences in the magnitude
of the decline are primarily due to the effects of population growth, which acts along the
extensive margin.
5According to the Congressional Budget Office (2019), the lowest quintile of the population saw a 9.3pp
decline in effective labor taxes from the 1980s to the 2010s. To illustrate the role of labor taxes, we consider
the extreme case in which labor taxes in the benchmark economy drop by 9.3pp for all workers.
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5 Conclusion
This paper asks how do changes in corporate taxation affect the lifecycle of firms. We
address this question using a model of firm dynamics that features occupational choice. In
this setting, a drop in profit taxes always increases wages, but the effects on firm selection
depend on parameter values. To pin down parameter values, we calibrate the model to the
US in the 1980s. We then perform counterfactual exercises and quantify the effects of profit
tax cuts along the intensive and extensive margins. We find that profit tax cuts operate
mostly through the intensive margin. If we consider changes in population growth, the
effects along the extensive margin are stronger for mature firms than for young firms.
In this paper we took corporate taxes as given and studied the optimal response of
firms to tax cuts along intensive and extensive margins. More generally, corporate taxes
are chosen to meet certain objectives of the taxing authority. These objectives involve con-
siderations such as meeting revenue targets, redistributing income and reducing tax avoid-
ance. The response of firms to changes in taxes affects the tax base, which might feedback
into the optimization problem of the tax authority. Future work could explore how such
feedback effects alter the incidence of corporate taxation.
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Appendix A Table
Table 7: Percentage Change in Average Firm Size
Age ≤ 10 Age > 10 Age ≤ 6 Age > 6
87-89 to 10-16 −12.3% −10.3% −13.4% −2.4%
87-89 to 10-13 −13.4% −10.8% −14.8% −3.3%
87-89 to 14-16 −10.9% −9.6% −11.5% −1.1%
82-89 to 10-16 — — −8.7% −1.8%
82-89 to 10-13 — — −10.1% −2.8%
82-89 to 14-16 — — −6.7% −0.5%
Source. US Business Dynamics Statistics.
Notes. Data for the ’age > 6’ group begins in 1982. Data for the ’age > 10’ group begins in 1987.
Appendix B Proofs
The value function of a firm is given by
V(z,wt) = max
{
b+
βw
1− β
, (1− τ)π(z,wt) + βE[V(z′,wt+1)|z]
}
It is useful to redefine the value function such that the outside option is zero. Let v denote
the new value function. We have
V(z,wt) = b+
βw
1− β
+max
{
0, (1− τ)π(z,wt)− b−
βw
1− β
+ βE[V(z′,wt+1)|z]
}
V(z,wt)− b−
βw
1− β
= max
{
0, (1− τ)π(z,wt)− (1− β)b− βw+ βE
[
V(z′,wt+1)− b−
βw
1− β
∣∣∣∣z] }
v(z,wt) = max
{
0, π˜(z,wt, τ) + βE[v(z′,wt+1)|z]
}
where we have redefined the flow of profits as π˜. The standard properties of the profit
function hold here, e.g. ∂π˜/∂w < 0 and ∂π˜/∂z > 0. The first order conditions of the profit
maximization problem do not get modified so optimal size is unaffected.
Notice that the entry and exit conditions get modified with the redefinition of the value
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function. The exit condition is now v(z∗,wt) = 0. Define
vet(wt) =
∫
v(z,wt)Γ(dz)
The entry condition is vet(wt) = ce + w− b.
For the comparative static exercise, it is helpful to define age-related variables. Let λa
denote the (unconditional) probability that a firm survives to age a. Let µ˜a denote the
(unconditional) probability distribution over the set of productivity shocks for the firm.
This distribution tells us what is the probability that a firm will have productivity z at a
particular age a. With these definitions in hand, we can write firm values as the expected
discounted value of profits. The value of a potential startup is
vet(wt) =
∫
v(z,wt)Γ(dz) =
∞
∑
a=0
βaλa
∫
π˜(z,wa, τ)µ˜a(dz) (A-1)
From here on, we restrict our attention to a stationary equilibrium.
B.1 Proof of Corollary 2.
Recall the inverse of the effective benefit of exit is a weighted sum of unity and the ratio of
average operating-firm value to the value of the marginal firm,
E[V(z,w∗)]
V(z∗,w∗)
= Γ(z∗) + [1− Γ(z∗)]
E[V(z,w∗)|z ≥ z∗]
V(z∗,w∗)
= β×
βce + βw1−β
b+ βw1−β
 (A-2)
Express this in terms of the modified value function v and write the mathematical ex-
pectations as integrals. Note that the conditional expectation is the expectation over the
distribution of zero year olds, µ˜0. We have
E[b+ βw∗/(1− β) + v(z,w∗)]
b+ βw∗/(1− β)
= Γ(z∗) + [1− Γ(z∗)]
E[b+ βw∗/(1− β) + v(z,w∗)|z ≥ z∗]
b+ βw∗/(1− β)
1+
E[v(z,w∗)]
b+ βw∗/(1− β)
= Γ(z∗) + [1− Γ(z∗)]
(
1+
E[v(z,w∗)|z ≥ z∗]
b+ βw∗/(1− β)
)
1+
∫
v(z,w∗)
b+ βw∗/(1− β)
Γ(dz) = Γ(z∗) + [1− Γ(z∗)]
(
1+
∫
v(z,w∗)
b+ βw∗/(1− β)
µ˜0(dz)
)
Now consider how each side of the average-to-marginal ratio changes with taxes. Suppose
b > βce, so an increase in the wage rate leads to an increase in inverse of the effective
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benefit of exit, and therefore the ratio on left hand side. Compare the derivative of both
sides with respect to τ, while keeping z∗ constant. We will abuse notation and simply write
this as the derivative with respect to τ. Note that µ˜0 first-order stochastically dominates Γ.
More generally, assume the following stochastic dominance property holds; see Hopenhayn
(1992a) for further discussion.
Assumption 1. Assume µ˜t is increasing in t in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
Under this assumption, the properties of the function inside the integral determines the
direction of the inequality.
Lemma 1. The function ddτ
(
v(z,w∗)
b+βw∗/(1−β)
)
is decreasing in z.
Proof. The derivative can be written as
d
dτ
(
v(z,w∗)
b+ βw∗/(1− β)
)
=
dv(z,w∗)
dτ (b+ βw
∗/(1− β)) + βv(z,w
∗)
1−β
dw∗
dτ
(b+ βw∗/(1− β))2
d
dτ
(
v(z,w∗)
b+ βw∗/(1− β)
)
=
dv(z,w∗)
dτ
b+ βw∗/(1− β)
+
βv(z,w∗)
1−β
dw∗
dτ
(b+ βw∗/(1− β))2
Now we show that each term on the right hand size is a decreasing function of z. We drop the
denominators because they do not depend on z and are positive. For the first function we have
d
dz
(
dv(z,w∗)
dτ
)
=
d
dz
 ∞∑
t=0
βtλt(z)
∫ [
−π(z′,w∗) + (1− τ)π2(z′,w∗)
dw∗
dτ
− β
dw∗
dτ
]
µ˜t(dz
′|z)

Consider z2 > z1. We have that µ˜t(dz′|z2) first-order stochastically dominates µ˜t(dz′|z1). The term
inside the brackets is negative and therefore a decreasing function of z′. It follows that integral
is declining in z. Because λt(z2) > λt(z1), reflecting the fact that higher productivity firms have
higher survival probabilities, it follows that the product of the survival probability and the integral
is decreasing in z.
The second term is decreasing in z because v(z,w∗) is increasing in z, and dw∗/dτ < 0. This
implies that the product dv(z,w∗)/dz× dw∗/dτ < 0.
Lemma 1 combined with the fact that µ˜0 first-order stochastically dominates Γ implies
the result in Corollary 2,
d
dτ
(
E[V(z,w∗)]
V(z∗,w∗)
) ∣∣∣∣∣
z∗
≥
d
dτ
(
E[V(z,w∗)|z ≥ z∗]
V(z∗,w∗)
) ∣∣∣∣∣
z∗
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B.2 Profit taxes in a canonical Hopenhayn model.
Suppose we get rid of occupational choice. The resulting model is a Hopenhayn (1992a)
model where the operating costs of a firm are not taxed, or equivalently paid from after
taxes are deducted from variable profits. The operating costs in this setting are (1− β)b.
We guess and verify that z∗ does not change with taxes in the canonical Hopenhayn model.
The wage elasticity of profits is given by
η ≡
dπ(z,w)
dw
×
w
π(z,w)
=
−α
1− α
The fact that this elasticity is independent of z will be useful in what follows. In this setting
π˜(z,w, τ) = (1− τ)π(z,w)− (1− β)b.
We can now evaluate how a change in τ affects the equilibrium wage rate in this simpler
model. Under the guess that z∗ does not change, the entry condition implies the following
dw∗
dτ
=
∑
∞
a=0 β
aλa
∫
π(z,w∗)µ˜a(dz)
∑
∞
a=0 β
aλa
∫
(1− τ)π2(z,w∗)µ˜a(dz)
(A-3)
Substitute for π2(.) = −α/(1− α)×π(.)/w∗ using the expression for profit elasticity above.
We obtain
dw∗
dτ
= −
1− α
α
×
w∗
1− τ
×
∑
∞
a=0 β
aλa
∫
π(z,w∗)µ˜a(dz)
∑
∞
a=0 β
aλa
∫
π(z,w∗)µ˜a(dz)
(A-4)
The integral terms cancel out and it follows that the elasticity of equilibrium wages with
respect to taxes in this model is (1− α)/α.6 Notice that the magnitude of the wage elasticity
and the inverse of the profit elasticity. This is why a change in taxes has no effect on the
exit threshold. Intuitively, the change in wages will undo the effect of the decrease in taxes.
This implies that firm profits do not change with taxes. From the entry condition we have
dve/dτ = 0. Similarly, we have dv(z∗)/dτ = 0. It follows that the exit threshold does not
change with τ.
6We are defining the elasticity as −dw/dτ× (1− τ)/w. This corresponds to the elasticity of w with respect
to 1− τ. It is convenient to refer to this elasticity as the elasticity of wages with respect to τ.
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